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Laws or Men ?
Is Government of Laws Being Superseded by Government of Partisans?-Decision by Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia Permits Labor to Restrain Interstate
Commerce With Impunity-Election of Judges for
14-Year Term Would Be Better IfPolitics Is to Invade
the Federal Judiciary

By DAVID LAWRENCE
NEVER before in the whole history of the United States has interpretation of the fundamental law of the land by the judiciary been so
enveloped in confusion and conflict. Have we a government of laws
or of men, of principles or factionalism, of fundamental concepts or
whimsical expediency?
For awhile the clash of viewpoints on constitutional law could
be classified as "liberal" and "conservative."
It seemed merely a basic
antagonism of rival philosophies and as such could be dignified as intellectually plausible.
But what shall we say of a three-judge Circuit Court of Appeals
-all
appointed during the New Deal-which disregards the trend
of judicial thought of the Supreme Court of the United States even
as recently "liberalized," and goes back to the days of the "conservative" court to find convenient precedents with which to permit a labor
union guilty of a "sit-down" strike to escape punishment under the
anti-trust laws?
To expand the federal power under the commerce clause of the
Constitution so as to protect labor came as a surprise in 1937 when
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Wagner labor law
but the decision was accepted as somehow an evolution necessary under
our system of government so as to enable the federal authority to
protect interstate commerce against a recurrence of strikes believed to
be due to the refusal of industrialists to grant collective bargaining.
But now when a C.I.O. union is caught in the
of the law having plainly interfered with
clutches
YARDSTICK
and stopped interstate commerce the Circuit Court
FOR LABOR
of Appeals in Philadelphia, consisting of three
judges appointed under the Roosevelt Administration, tells the public that a "sit-down" strike, notwithstanding its "effect" on interstate
commerce, did not "restrain" such commerce in a legal sense, or at
least that the union couldn't possibly have meant it that way. Another
*Reprinted from the United States News, an independent weekly dealing with
National Affairs, published at Washington. D. C.
A DIFFERENT
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set of judges in the same court held just the opposite less than two
years ago.
One judicial yardstick for industry and another for labor? Will
not the federal judiciary under the New Deal be accused now of having
"economic predilections" in its basic interpretation of the law?
Maybe a politically chosen judiciary is inevitable. If so, then
the system in vogue in the state of New York in selecting members
of the Court of Appeals would be far better than appointment for
life on the federal bench. The people can better be trusted to choose
judges at elections through a bi-partisan nominating system for a term
of 14 years than a single administration can be allowed to select judges
who will be able for a lifetime to deal partisanly with the fundamental
laws of the land.
This criticism of the Circuit Court of Appeals members is not
in any sense directed at individuals.
It is directed against a trend
which has been slowly developing among the Administration's appointees to the federal bench and which has not been as palpably revealed heretofore as in the decision last week on the Apex case by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
The court held to be sure that anti-trust laws
REVERSAL OF
TE NEW DEAL could be applied to the activities of labor unions
but that in the Apex case the labor unions' conduct
POSITION
of a "sit-down strike" while reprehensible, did not
"restrain" interstate commerce to a sufficient extent to constitute a
violation of the anti-trust laws.
The criterion, it was pointed out, was the "extent and intent of
the interference with commerce considered against the background of
social consequences."
The three judges ruled there was no extensive
interference even though it was proved that the company did an annual
business of $5,000,000 and bought all of its raw materials and shipped
80 per cent of its completed merchandise in interstate commerce. And,
what was worse, the court said there was no restraint for the purpose of
the anti-trust laws on interstate commerce even though the strikers
by seizing the plant actually prevented the shipment of 13.4,000 dozens
of finished hosiery, about 80 per cent of which had been consigned to
firms in other states. To ignore such pressing actualities the court
must indeed have wrapped itself in exactly the judicial "intellectual
vacuum" which the Supreme Court has condemned for purposes of
evaluating effects on interstate commerce.
Anybody who has been reading the cases growing out of the
National Labor Relations Act knows how time and again the courts
recite the fact that a business which ships even a small portion of its
materials in or out of interstate commerce becomes subject to the
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Wagner law on the theory that a strike might possibly interrupt commerce.
A theoretical strike, a potential strike, a strike not yet born can
"affect" and, indeed, may impair interstate commerce to such an extent
that nearly every business establishment today has come under federal
jurisdiction. Still actual physical interruption occasioned by men who
seize property and stop shipments is not a "restraint" of interstate
commerce according to the Third Circuit.
Could anything more clearly indicate a government of men rather
than laws-whim rather than principle?
Will not laymen tend to lose confidence in a federal judiciary
which disregards at will even doctrines established by the so-called
"liberal" majority of the Supreme Court of the United States?
It is difficult to reconcile the decision in the
Apex case by the Third Circuit with many of the
precedents established by the Supreme Court of the
United States prior to 1937. When upholding the
constitutionality of the Wagner Act in a 5 to 4 opinion in 1937, Chief
Justice Hughes took the "second Coronado case" as his buttressing
argument. The Supreme Court had held, he said, in that instance
that there was evidence, lacking in the "first Coronado case," to prove
that the property destroyed by the unions was destroyed to prevent
employers from shipping coal in interstate commerce. Consequently
Congress, he declared, had the power to select compulsory collective
bargaining as a means of protecting interstate commerce.
But the Apex case actually involves not only a destruction of
production facilities but also a deliberate refusal by the unions to permit
goods ready for shipment to move into interstate commerce. Here is
an obviously successful attempt at interference with commerce. And
yet the laws prohibiting restraint of trade are held not applicable.
How was this done? By simply indulging in a bit of curious
reasoning. The Circuit Court judges said that the "second Coronado
case" did not apply because the amount of coal excluded from interstate
commerce was a factor, yet any close reading of the Supreme Court's
own words in the "second Coronado case" shows that it emphasized
the volume of coal, not on the question of the extent of restraint necessary under the Sherman Act, but on the question of sufficiency of the
evidence to show intent to restrain interstate commerce.
But even if the Apex decision be considered as consistent with
the "second Coronado case," it is difficult to reconcile what the Third
Circuit said last week with recent cases involving the National Labor
Relations Act. The Third Circuit Court took cognizance of a possible
raising of this question by announcing that the Wagner Act cases
RULING IS
CONTRARY TO
PRECEDENTS
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turned on the use of the word "affect" in that law and that "affecting"
interstate commerce is different from "restraining" interstate commerce. Hence, it said, the scope of the: Wagner Act is broader than
that of the anti-trust laws.
Unquestionably the word "affect" has a broad
IS RESTRAINT
connotation but in the Wagner Act the
general
or
A MATTER
word "affect" was used in a particular sense, "affectOF INTENT?
ing commerce" being specifically defined by Congress
And the Supreme Court
as "burdening or obstructing commerce."
of the United States in 1937 went far in brushing aside all previous
decisions to say that a possible strike due to labor trouble could be and
really did constitute a direct effect on interstate commerce.
In the Apex case, on the other hand, we have as direct an effect
on interstate commerce as could be imagined-a physical interruption
by acts of violence. Still the Third Circuit Court is content to condemn such lawless performance with vehement words, refusing to
permit a decision rendered in 1937 by the same Third Circuit Court
composed of different judges to stand now.
The Third Circuit Court endeavors to justify its decision by declaring that the purpose of the "sit-down" strikers was ,not at all to
interrupt interstate commerce but to carry on a labor dispute and that
the stoppage of the shipments and the seizure of the plant were steps
incidental to the conduct of the strike itself. Apologies here should
be made to Secretary Perkins, former Governor Murphy, of Michigan,
John L. Lewis and all others who were bitterly criticised in 1937 for
believing that the "sit-down" strike might some day day win the court's
tolerance.
Under such a twisted concept of the law, as the Third Circuit
now invokes, "sit-down" strikes could be carried on almost with impunity. It avails little that the Apex Company is advised now to sue
in the Pennsylvania state courts-a sort of passing of the buck to the
states. But if this is right and if everything written here about inconsistency with previous precedents is wrong, then hereafter may we
expect the same Third Circuit Court to declare invalid various provisions of the Wagner law and to advise labor unions to seek redress in
state courts when employers refuse to grant collective bargaining privileges?
The Third Circuit Court gave no effect to the words of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Jones & Laughlin case:
"The fact that there appears to have been no major disturbance in that industry (the steel industry) in the more
recent period did not dispose of the possibilities of future
and like dangers to interstate commerce which Congress was
entitled to foresee and could exercise its protective power to
forestall."
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Again in the recent Fainblatt case, the Supreme Court said:
"Nor do we think it important, as respondents seem to
argue, that the volume of the commerce here involved, though
substantial, was relatively small as compared with that in the
cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act which
have hitherto engaged our attention. The power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all
such commerce be it great or small ...
"The exercise of congressional power under the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act,
or the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, has never been
thought to be constitutionally restricted because in any particular case the volume of the commerce affected may be small.
Here then in two separate citations we find support for the principle that neither small volume of business entering interstate commerce in a given case nor absence of a major disturbance prevents the
exercise by Congress of its power to protect interstate commerce against
interference. In the Apex case there was a major disturbance; likewise
80 per cent of the production was kept out of interstate commerce by
physical violence. The two most important elements were present but
still commerce was held not restrained. Possibly it wasn't even "affected."
But let us look at a decision last week by the
CONFIDENCE
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit,
DICIARY
I
where it was held that a milk wagon driver's union
IS WEAKENED
had violated the Sherman and Clayton anti-trust
laws by interfering with interstate commerce through the picketing
of dairy stores in Chicago. This court said:
"We think it is clear that interstate commerce was involved and was quite seriously affected and burdened by the
picketing activities of the defendants in and about the stores
that sold the milk in controversy. ...
"We think that their acts did constitute an unlawful
conspiracy within the purview of the Sherman and the Clayton Acts."
What then is the law? Is it what any judges say it shall be?
This evidently is the New Deal concept. Give us the judges and we
will make the laws-so runs the philosophy of economic partisans
who thus fan the flames of internal discord and hasten the days when
civil strife in America becomes intensified even as confidence in the
judiciary disintegrates.
We are in the midst of a civil war today between capital and
labor. Violence in picketing and "sit downs" and "slow downs" are
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weapons far more dangerous than any alleged economic inequality sought
to be corrected by the Wagner law. The "slow-down" strike was used
with impunity in the Chrysler dispute which cost the nation many
millions of dollars. Yet not a single labor leader will ever be held to
accountability under federal law for bringing on this huge economic
loss to society. Certainly not if we have any more decisions like that
rendered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Confidence in the judiciary is a prerequisite to democracy. We
cannot escape the conclusion that what three recently-named judges
have done in the Apex case will cast suspicion on the so-called "reconstruction" or reorganization of the federal judiciary. Perhaps it is
ironical proof that the extremists, economic radicals and economic
conservatives, when they acquire judicial power are merely brothers

under the skin.

BAR INTEGRATION
Colorado Bar Is Virtually Integrated
The most recent developments in the Colorado bar raised the
question, "when is a state bar integrated?" The test heretofore has been
the application of rules, whether statutory or judicial in origin, that
impose upon every practitioner a definite obligation. The obligation
most readily observed is that of contributing to the cost of bar regulation. The Colorado situation is unique; almost every practitioner in
the state is now contributing to the cost of maintaining both local and
state bar associations. It was told in this Journal a year ago how
the Colorado State Bar Association had provided for dual membership
and control of the state organization by members of.a board of governors
to be elected by the members of local associations. Dues for individual
memberships were fixed at six dollars and dues paid by locals for their
members at three dollars. Most of the local associations became affiliated
under this democratic plan immediately, and in advance of the annual
meeting held September 22-23 this year it was announced that the
last two local associations, one of which had just been organized, had
become affiliated, so that the State Association now includes every lawyer
in the state except a few in mountainous counties where there are not
enough to justify local organization.
It is fair to assume that a third route to bar integration exists.
Labels are not consequential; the status is the vital matter. The Colorado state bar is now so nearly unanimous as to deserve to be included
in the list of integrated state bars. Its recent history should stimulate
lawyers in such states as Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode
Island and Delaware to follow the Colorado example.
(From Journal of The American Judicature Society, December, 1939.)

Criminal
Responsibility
for War
By I. W. Kelley*
N THE early months of 1919, when the twenty-six Allied
and Associated Powers were represented in Paris, a Commission of fifteen members was chosen to punish by criminal proceedings the persons responsible for the World War.
On the cause of the war the Commission was unanimous,
finding it to have been due to Austria-Hungary aided and
abetted by Germany. The Commission found the person
principally responsible was the ruler of these powers, therefore the 227th article of the Treaty of Versailles contains the
following, in the nature of an indictment found by all the
fifteen members of the Commission, proceeding after the manner of a grand jury.
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby
assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be
composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following powers:
namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and
Japan.
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a requesz to the
government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the exEmperor in order that he may be put on trial.

The government of the Netherlands then occupied the
position of an American state when asked to surrender a fugitive upon extradition. On January 15, 1920, the Supreme
Council addressed an official demand to Holland "to deliver
into their hands William of Hohenzollern, former Emperor of
Germany, in order that he may be judged." This communica*Of the Denver Bar.
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tion contained an imposing lecture reminding Holland of "her
international duty to associate herself with other nations as
far as her means allowed in undertaking, or at least not hindering, chastisement of the crimes committed."
The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying to the
demand of the Allied Powers, called attention to the fact that
Holland was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles and, having been a neutral in the war, was in no way bound to associate
itself with the twenty-six other nations which secured the indictment against the Kaiser.
The Dutch also called attention to the fact that there was
no tribunal in existence at the time of the World War for the
trial and punishment of persons engaged in it.
The Holland reply also contained a delicate hint that en-.
lightened persons, such as composed the Supreme Council,
must easily perceive that any tribunal set up after the commission of an act, for the purpose of making that a crime which
was not a crime when committed, was scarcely in conformity
with law and procedure as understood by modern civilized
nations.
This reply was received and considered by the Council of
Ambassadors, successors to the Supreme Council, which was
dissolved five days after the first communication was sent to
the Dutch government. In the name of all the Allies the Council of Ambassadors dispatched a rather lengthy communication to the host of the fugitive Kaiser, exhorting Holland to
make common cause with them in the punishment of her guest.
It was stated in this note that the members of the Council
could not "conceal their surprise" at not finding in the Dutch
reply a single word of disapproval of the crimes committed
against international morality.
On March 5, 1920, the Allies received a reply to this second note, suggesting that the Dutch government was mindful
of its obligations to humanity but that its soil had, from immemorial times, been a sanctuary for fugitives guilty of politi-
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cal offenses, and adding that its understanding was that military courts punished acts done contrary to the laws of war and
that if in the future some arrangement was made by the Society
of Nations for punishing criminally the vanquished in war for
offenses committed upon the soil of other nations, Holland
might see fit to take a different view.
Matters had now reached an empasse. In the Treaty of
Versailles, article 227-A has this to say:
The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and
Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of

having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.
Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid
down by law.
The foregoing was agreed to by the German government
when its representatives signed the treaty. This was not contrary to the accepted practice of International Law. A military
court may try and punish offenders against the laws of war in
a proper case after hostilities have ceased. In our own country
Henry Wirz, commandant of the Confederate Prison at Andersonville, Georgia, during the Civil War, was tried by a military commission sitting in the city of Washington, and executed by hanging in November, 1865. It seemed clear to everyone connected with the case of the Kaiser that it was one
thing to try him by a military court and another to set up a
tribunal after the offense was committed, for the specific purpose of punishing what had not been punishable before. In
the case of U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, this point was decided in our own country, Judges Marshall and Story being
on the court at the time.
It was hardly possible to proceed against the Kaiser in a
military court. Generals Pershing, Foch, Haig, and Diaz, of
the United States, French, English, and Italian forces, were
the only commanders qualified to sit in such a trial, a proper
military tribunal being composed of persons of equal rank to
the accused. Soldiers do not readily convict commanders of
opposing forces. They foresee the day when they, by the
chances of war, might be tried in the same way. The possibility of a criminal trial of the Kaiser, in his absence, being out
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of the question, the Society of Nations had recourse to another
paragraph of article 228 of the treaty, which is:
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons
accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs
of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German authorities.

After the ratification of the treaty, a list of commanders
of armed forces, accused of the commission of crimes against
the laws of war, was served by special messenger upon the
German Chancellor of Berlin, demanding the extradition of
the persons named. This list contained about nine hundred
names.
There was no court indicated in the treaty in which these
nine hundred persons could be tried and the lawyers of the
German government took advantage of this situation by offering the use of the German courts for that purpose, the proposition being as follows:
The German Government is willing to instruct the German legal
authorities immediately to take proceedings based upon the material to
be transmitted against all the Germans who are named by the Entente
as guilty of offences against the laws and usages of war. It will suspend
all the laws which might stand in the way of such proceedings, and will
go so far as to suspend the existing amnesty laws.
Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments which are
concerned in each particular case will be given the right directly to participate in the proceedings.

The lawyers of the Allied Powers read the second paragraph of article 228 again and perceived from its terms that
while the German government agreed to "hand over" any persons named for trial, there was no agreement as to where the
trial should be, and it was insisted by the German government
that the meaning of the paragraph was that the Allies should
prosecute the accused in the German courts, themselves acting
as prosecutors.
So plausible was this rejoinder that under date of February 13, 1920, the Council of Ambassadors made this item a
matter of record.
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The prosecution which the German Government itself purposes
immediately to institute in this manner is compatible with Article 228
of the Peace Treaty, and is expressly provided for at the end of its first
paragraph.

As far as the venue was concerned, the German lawyers
seemed to have decidedly the best of it.
The Council of Ambassadors then got to work and from
the many cases before them, picked out forty-six test cases,
each nation selecting the cases in which it had a special interest.
Neither the United States nor Japan attempted to prosecute
anyone. The American sense of humor, in which the Japanese, being apt in imitation, apparently shared, prevented our
being involved in the farce. Of course nothing came of the
prosecutions.
On the 18th of December, 1920, the League of Nations
approved the report from one of its committees to the effect
that "there is not yet any international penal law recognized
by all nations."
The above quoted statement still remains true. Among
the many blunders committed at Versailles was the failure to
provide for the punishment, by international criminal law, of
the rulers of countries responsible for the violation of treaties
by armed force and the crimes against international morality.
This omission leaves persons who plunge nations into war
without cause or justification to be judged merely by their own
countrymen and, as in the case of the Kaiser, if they flee from
their own country they escape judgment. The machinery set
up by the League of Nations and the Court of International
Justice is entirely futile in this important respect.
The Allied and Associated Powers could have enacted an
International Penal Code to make certain wrongful acts by
rulers of nations "a crime and affix a punishment to it and
declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense."
U. S. vs. Hudson, supra. The prospect of the death penalty
would go a long way to prevent upstart dictators from recklessly plunging the world into war. Any American backwoods legislature could have handled this problem more intelligently than it was dealt with at Paris.
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SIMULATION OF PROCESS?
DEBTOR'S NOTICE
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, That unless this claim is
settled or some satisfactory arrangement is made on or before October
24th, A. D. 1939, suit will be brought against you and the matter
will be pushed to final judgment.
This notice is given for the benefit of those whose debts remain unpaid through oversight, carelessness, or on account of some good and
sufficient reason, and who do not desire to defraud their creditors. No
further notice will be given.
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 17th day of October, A. D. 1939.

Uniform Stage Laws
Proposed in 1939
By CHARLES H. QUEARY*
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws convened its forty-ninth annual meeting at San Francisco,
California, July 3, 1939. The National Conference consists of three
or more commissioners from each of the states, the territories of Alaska,
Hawaii, Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia, appointed by the governors of the states and territories and
the president of the United States for the District of Columbia. Seventyone commissioners, representing forty-one states and territories, were in
attendance at the conference. The National Conference includes among
its members many who are outstanding as educators, legal authorities
and technical experts in the drafting of laws.
The object of the National Conference is to promote uniformity
in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable and
practical. The work of the conference is accomplished through standing
The standing Committee on Scope and
and special committees.
Program must approve all proposals of subjects of legislation before
the same are referred to special committees with instructions to report
drafts of acts. Tentative drafts of approved subjects are submitted by
the committees from year to year and are discussed by the conference
in its Committee of the Whole at its annual meetings. A uniform
act approved by the National Conference is thus the result of a study
of tentative drafts, subject to the criticism, correction and emendation
of the collective commissioners who represent the experience and judgment of a select body of lawyers chosen from every part of the United
States and its territories.
Since its organization in 1892, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted and approved ninetythree acts. Some of these acts have become obsolete, others have been
combined, and at the present time seventy-seven acts stand as recommended for adoption by the legislative bodies of- the states and territories. The General Assembly of Colorado has approved twelve of
*Chairman of the Committee on Uniform State Laws and Legislation of the
Colorado Bar Association, and member of the National Conference from Colorado.
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these acts-the best known of which are the Negotiable Instruments
Act, the Partnership Acts, and the Warehouse Receipts Act.
At its 1939 meeting the National Conference approved six acts
which will be urged for adoption by the forthcoming regular sessions
of the legislative bodies of the states and territories. A brief summary
of the purposes of the proposed acts is included here.
UNIFORM ACT RELATING TO ACKNOWLEDGMENTS OF
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.
The Uniform Acknowledgment Act is the result of the rewriting
of two former acts approved by the conference, eliminating confusion
occasioned by their contradictory provisions. The act merely provides
that where by the law of the state an acknowledgment of an instrument is required to be made it may be made in the manner and form
either provided for by existing state statute or in the manner and
form prescribed by the act. There is no attempt to say what instruments shall be acknowledged and no attempt is made to repeal the existing state laws on the subject, the act being permissive in that the
acknowledgment may be made in either form. The act provides for
acknowledgment within the state of acknowledgments made in other
states in prescribed manner. There is a necessity and demand for a
more modern enactment of acknowledgments in many of the states
and more uniformity on the subject in all of the states. The act will
provide both without disturbing the existing law of the states which
desire to adopt it.
UNIFORM ACT PROVIDING FOR EVIDENTIAL EFFECT OF
ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND FOR THE DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY OF ABSENTEES UNHEARD
OF FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS.
We are all familiar with many cases where persons have disappeared, leaving -families and property, and have been unheard of for
a period of years although diligent search and inquiry have been made.
In such cases there is a very practical side of the picture to be considered. As long as it is unknown whether the absentee be living or
dead, rights must remain uncertain and property remain undistributed.
This practical situation has been met in many states by the enactment
of statutes providing that upon the disappearance, continuous and un-
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explained, of persons owning property for a certain period (usually
seven years) the death of such person will be presumed. Many of the
states have no such statute, the courts recognizing common law presumption of death arising from the unexplained absence of a person
from his place of residence for seven years, subject to rebuttal. The
National Conference believes that the seven year absence rule is arbitrary,
founded upon no reason, and is obstructive to the ascertainment of
rights and disposition of property. The basis of the uniform act is
to cease attempting to solve a problem which in its nature is insolvable
by an arbitrary rule of evidence, and to fix by statute a certain and
definite rule for the disposition of the property of the absentee unheard
of after a lapse of time, after diligent search and inquiry, and this regardless of the period of absence and without regard to whether the
absentee is living or dead. The act corrects an intolerable situation resulting from absence of an individual, unexplained, continuous, unheard of, leaving a family to be supported, debts to be paid and collected, life insurance to be paid, and a business to be carried on. The
situation calls for a remedy and the act provides it.
UNIFORM ACT GOVERNING SECURED CREDITORS' DIVIDENDS IN LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS.
Four varied rules concerning the treatment of secured creditors in
liquidation proceedings have been evolved by the courts. Eight states
have adopted the bankruptcy rule making disposition upon the face
of the claim less the value of the collateral. Ten states have approved
the Maryland plan, adopting as a basis the balance owing at the time
of declaring each dividend, crediting only amounts realized from collateral. Two states follow the Illinois rule-the balance owing at the
time of presenting the claim without deduction for collateral. The
United States and eighteen states have followed the equity rule using
the balance owing at the time of transfer in insolvency, without deduction for collateral as a basis. In no state does the scope of legislation include all types of liquidation proceedings. States which have
enacted statutes have all adopted the principle of the bankruptcy rule,
and legislation on the subject in all English speaking countries has generally followed the principle of the bankruptcy rule. The rule used
vitally affects the adequacy of security and the evaluation of other
claims, present or prospective. Uniformity is desirable for the benefit
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of interstate business generally. The proposed uniform act adopts the
principle of the bankruptcy rule as being the only one likely to be
generally accepted by the legislatures of the several states.
UNIFORM ACT CONCERNING THE LIQUIDATION, REHABILITATION, REORGANIZATION OR CONSERVATION OF INSURERS DOING BUSINESS IN MORE THAN
ONE STATE.
The forced liquidation or reorganization of many insurance companies in recent years has brought to light certain 'problems peculiar
to the liquidation of businesses having assets and liabilities distributed
in two or more states. Assets take the form generally of special deposits required by state laws, balances in the hands of insurance agents,
policy premiums due but unpaid, and investment of reserve funds.
Liabilities consist primarily of policy obligations distributed over the
several states in which the companies do business. This wide distribution of assets and liabilities creates many problems. The equitable and
expeditious solution of these problems is rendered more difficult because
of wide differences in the provisions of state statutes regarding deposits,
preferred claims, securities, set off, and the administrative and judicial
procedures followed. If statutory means can be provided which will
eradicate these difficulties, they will be of great service. It is proposed
to accomplish this by presenting a properly formulated uniform act
containing appropriate reciprocal provisions. It is believed that a
general adoption of the act will greatly facilitate proceedings commenced
for the liquidation, rehabilitation or reorganization of insurance companies and will promote the equitable distribution of the assets of
defunct insurers.
UNIFORM ACT CONCERNING CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS, RELEASE OF TORTFEASORS, PROCEDURE ENABLING RECOVERY OF CONTRIBUTION.
It is fundamental that there should be an equal or proportionate
distribution of a common burden among those upon whom the burden
rests. If one discharges a common burden, it is natural that his claim
against others so burdened for contribution to the discharge shall be
recognized. It is apparent that an injury resulting from the joint tort
of two or more persons involves each of them, jointly and severally,
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in liability for the entire damage. This appears to be a typical instance of the discharge of a common liability to be governed by the
principle of contribution.
But the policy of the Anglo-American
common law has been to deny assistance to tortfeasors on the understanding that they are wrongdoers and hence not deserving of the aid
of courts in achieving equal or proportionate distribution of the common burden. Most joint and several tort liability results from inadvertently caused damage, although it is almost impossible to draw a
practical line between torts of inadvertence and others. The situation
is aggravated by the common law view that the injured person may
place the loss where and how he sees fit. He cannot be compelled to
take judgment against tortfeasors whom he does not wish to sue. By
refusing to sue or take judgment against one or more tortfeasors
commonly liable, the injured person may confer immunity from contribution and at the same time secure complete compensation from the
luckless tortfeasor whom he wishes to make liable. It is apparent that
there is a necessity for the establishment of a uniform and common
policy of contribution and responsibility, and this has been adopted
and embodied in the proposed uniform statute.
UNIFORM ACT PROVIDING FOR PERIODS OF LIMITATION
WITHIN WHICH ACTIONS MAY BE COMMENCED IN
THE COURTS OF THIS STATE.
Numerous studies have disclosed the utmost diversity in the laws
of the several states relative to periods of limitation. There appears to
be no great difference in the public policy of. the states relative to the
subject matter. In the proposed uniform act procedural matters therefore have been avoided and no attempt is made in the act to define
those events which start or suspend the running of the period. The
act avoids the prescribing of methods of pleading the bar of the
statute. The act only attempts to make uniform the period of limitations for classes of actions. It is believed that this will be welcomed
by business interests.
All of the foregoing acts have had the approval of the American
Bar Association, and, where related, of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the American Law Institute.*
*In the preparation of this article acknowledgment is made to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for source material selected
from the Handbook of Proceedings of the Conference for the Year 1939.
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STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND DUES
THE ABILITY of any organization to become useful to its members
depends upon the spirit of the members of the group and the financial
ability of the organization to undertake tasks which are essential to
maintaining the purposes and the program of the organization. All
too frequently the spirit of the members is dependent upon the state
of the treasury.
It is therefore apparently desirable to keep a nice balance between
organization spirit and organization financial ability. What that
balance is depends upon many factors, some of which are incapable of
being analyzed. Two fundamental premises are at once apparent: first,
dues cannot be too high or they will drive members away from the organization; and second, dues cannot be too low or the organization
cannot carry on many desired and desirable objects with the result
that member; become dissatisfied with the accomplishments of an organization.
Bar associations have been faced with the problem of dues for
many years. No answer has been obtained which will be satisfactory
to every one; yet the combined experience of the dues problem does
answer certain questions. It tells the minimum figure below which it
is disastrous for a worthwhile organization to proceed. It tells the
maximum figure beyond which it is dangerous to assess and expect to
retain membership. It indicates the level of experience.
The highest fee charged by any state association is that of the
Louisiana State Bar Association whose members within New Orleans
are assessed $20.00 a year, according to the American Bar Association.
The Bar Association of the District of Columbia is second with a
$12.00 yearly assessment, while five other associations have $10.00
yearly dues. Twelve associations have dues over five but less than
twelve dollars. A yearly dues of $5.00 seems to be the most popular
as twenty-six associations have adopted that figure. The lowest charge
is that of the North Carolina Bar Association which is $2.00.
The average yearly dues of the fifty-three associations listed on
the following table is $5.66. Integrated bar associations have an average fee of $6.02, while the other associations charge yearly dues which
average $5.44.
In contrast to these dues of the bar association, the various state
medical associations charge dues which vary from $4.00 to $20.00
per year, according to Dr. Olin West, secretary of the American Medical
Association. On the whole the dues of the medical associations, both
local and state, are higher than those of the bar associations.
It will thus be seen that The Colorado Bar Association is at
present $2.44 per year lower in dues than other associations of a same
Its present revenue is approximately $3,000.00 per
classification.
year. The following table indicates the present status of the dues
situation within the state association.
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STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS
*Integrated State Bars.
tAlso Integrated-at bottom of page.

Annual
Dues
*Alabama State Bar Association -------..------...............................-------------.
$10.00
*The State Bar of Arizona ------------...................-----------------------------------------.
, 5.00
*Bar Association of Arkansas -----------------------------..------------------------------------------5.00
*The State Bar of California ------------------7.50
The Colorado Bar Association
-----------------------------$3.00 and 6.00
State Bar Association of Connecticut ------------..........----------------------------------5.00
Delaware State Bar Association -------------------------------------------------------------5.00
Bar Association of the District of Columbia -------------------------------------------12.00
Florida State Bar Association -------------------------------------------------------------------------5.00
Georgia Bar Association --------- .........................-----------------------------------------------5.00
Bar Association of Hawaii -------------------------.....--------------------------------------------5.00
*Idaho State Bar----------------.-.----------------------.......................
--------------7.50
Illinois State Bar Association
---------------------5.00
Indiana State Bar Association
---------------7.00
Iowa State Bar Association
---------------------------------4.00
The Bar Association of the State of Kansas ............
5.00
Kentucky State Bar Association .....................----------- 5.00
tLouisiana State Bar Association ------------------------------------------------$20.00 and 5.00
Maine State Bar Association ------------------------.......------------------------------------------2.00
M aryland State Bar Association ------------------....-------------------............
7.0 0
Massachusetts Bar Association ---------------------------------------------5.00
*State B ar of M ichigan -------------------------------------------------.-.----...................-- - - 5.00
Minnesota State Bar Association ------.................................................-------3.00
*M ississippi State B ar ----------...---.-.---...-------------.-.-.-.......................--- - - 5.00
*Missouri Bar Association
-----------------------------------10.00
Montana Bar Association ------------------------------------------------------------------------------3.00
*Nebraska State Bar Association -....-------------...............................-- - - - -... . 5.00
*State Bar of Nevada------------------------7.00
Bar Association of State of New Hampshire -----------------------------------------------3.00
New Jersey State Bar Association ---------------------------------------------------------------7.50
*State Bar of N ew M exico -----------------------...----------------------....................-- - - - 5.00
New York State Bar Association -----------------------------------------------------------------10.00
tNorth Carolina Bar Association -------------------------------------------------------------------2.00
*State Bar Association of North Dakota -------------------------------------------------------10.00
Ohio'State Bar Association ------- ------------------------.....................-----------8.00
Oklahoma State Bar-----------.-.----------------------------.......................-------------3.00
*Oregon State Bar -------------------------------------------------------------------.--.--------------6.00
Pennsylvania Bar Association --------------------.........-----------------------------------------8.00
Rhode Island Bar Association ..............................---------------------------------------10.00
South Carolina Bar Association -----------------------------------------------------------------5.00
*State Bar of South Dakota -------------------------.----............................-----------5.00
Bar Association of Tennessee -------------------------------------------------------5.00
*State Bar of Texas ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6.00
*Utah State Bar Association ------------------------------------------..............----------5.00
Vermont Bar Association -----------------------------------------------------------------------------5.00
tVirginia State Bar Association ---- ..........................-----------------------------------------7.00
*Washington State Bar Association ----------------------..................----------------------5.00
West Virginia Bar Association -------------------......................-----------..------5.00
State Bar Association of Wisconsin ------------.................................----------5.00
*Wyoming Bar Association
-------------------------------$5.00 and 10.00
t'The State Bar of Louisiana (not recognized by the ABA) -----------...---- 3.00
f'The North Carolina State Bar ----------------------------------....---------------------------5.00
t*Virginia State Bar------------.-.--.----------.-..--------.......................--------------3.50

Current Events of
Bench and Bar
By FRED E. NEEF
0

Issue Taken With Bar Critic
IN AN ADDRESS to the annual convention of the Commercial Law
League of America, Edwin M. Otterbourg, of New York, Chairman
of the ABA committee on unauthorized practice of law, took issue
with the allegation of Solicitor General Jackson that while the rich and
the poor get adequate legal service, the man who is neither rich nor
poor must often forego it because of the cost. Mr. Otterbourg pointed
to statistics showing the deplorable economic condition of a large number of lawyers, and stated that lawyers would not be so foolish as to
overcharge the public and diminish their opportunities for employment.
Lack of public understanding of the necessity, as well as the availability
of legal services, and weakened public confidence in the bar, were assigned by him as the causes for people going without legal service.

Political Activities of Jurists Condemned
Judges who seek political offices without resigning their judicial
positions were denounced by a recent opinion handed down by the

ABA's committee on professional ethics and grievances. Although no
specific case was referred to in the opinion, the opinion said that it

hoped the general criticism would accomplish more constructive results than any disciplinary action. The committee said that judicial

ethics canons 28 and 30 could not be easily adhered to in states where
judges are nominated in party conventions or primaries and run on
party tickets, and that it doubted whether the judiciary was fully aware
of their rigid requirements. A promise was made to forcibly bring
such canons to the attention of the judiciary, if violations occurred in
the future.

Liability Without Negligence
Liability without proof of negligence is the new type of auto-

mobile policy that is being quietly effected by both stock and mutual

insurance companies. Under this policy the medical expenses of the
injured parties will be paid without regard to legal fault and under

the same principle as that of the workmen's compensation laws.

The

top limit payable for medical expenses of each injured person may be

set at either $250 or $500, according to the amount of premium paid.

An expected result of these policies is the reduction of automobile in-

surance litigation.
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South of the Border
A summons was recently issued by the Los Angeles Municipal
Court to Senor Roberto C. Andeyo to explain the workings of his
$60,000 a year Mexican mail order divorce business, that he has been
doing in Los Angeles County. State Bar Investigator Herbert Hallner
alleges that Roberto had taken at least 1,000 divorce cases out of Los
Angeles into Mexico at price ranging from $50 to $100. One of his
ads reads as follows: "Consent decree one day; others 15 days." He is
charged with practicing law without a license; advertising the procurement of divorces, and holding himself out as a lawyer.

Night Court Abandoned
The notorious Los Angeles night court, which was famed in song
and story, especially of the Hollywood variety, stands adjourned sine
die. The original idea of the Court was to enable persons charged
with misdemeanors to have their cases disposed of outside of working
hours, and to provide a convenient time for the attendance of employed witnesses. The lawyers of the Los Angeles Bar Association
were almost unanimous in their opposition to the night court idea.
The record of the Court's operations revealed that 80%o of the defendants were drunks, who had to wait until morning to sober up, and
a goodly portion of the remainder were prostitutes whose inconvenience
as to hours of employment was not considered a matter of grave
public concern.
Where to Practice Law
A survey was recently conducted by the Illinois State Bar Association to determine where in the State of Illinois existed the best opportunity to practice the law. This survey took in the entire state outside
of Cook County. From an inspection of the data compiled by this
survey an opportunity is given the young lawyer to determine the
best locality to commence the practice of law. Many statistics were
compiled by the survey which are of considerable interest. It was revealed that the annual gross income of all lawyers in all counties except
Cook was $1,595 in the first five years; $2,740 in the second five
years; and $4,288 in the second ten years; and $5,886, after twenty
years. It was also found that a uniform fee schedule gave the Bar a
higher annual income than where there was either a partial or no
uniformity in prices for professional services.

Placement Bureau for Lawyers
A lawyers' placement bureau was recently opened up by the Los
Angeles Bar Association. The function of the bureau is not only that
of assisting those lawyers who are seeking employment, but also those
law offices and agencies that may be in need of legal assistance and
legally trained employees.
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NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT BAR MEETING
THE NINTH Judicial District Bar Association met for dinner at the
Miller House, in Meeker, Colorado, on Saturday, December 16th, 1939,
at 7 o'clock, P. M. The association had as its guests, Judge Charles
E. Herrick and Fred A. Videon, of Craig, Colorado. After dinner,
the meeting reconvened in the District Court Room.
Judge John R. Clark made a report on the State Bar Convention,
and William A. Mason gave a report on the meeting of the Board of
Governors. Judge Carl W. Fulghum ended the program by a talk
on possible desirable changes in the probate laws of the State; particularly as to procedure, to handle probate business with more dispatch.
A business meeting followed, and it was proposed and carried
that Hon. John T. Shumate, former District Judge of this district for
36 years, be made an honorary member of the association an account
of his long, distinguished service on the bench and his eminence in the
legal profession.
The question of unauthorized practice in the district was discussed and the Grievance Committee was instructed by the president
to obtain evidence and take action upon unauthorized practice in the
district.
After the business meeting, Judge Charles E. Herrick made a
talk on "Americanism" in which he suggested that the young people
of this state and of the nation should be better instructed as to their
priceless heritage. Attorney Fred A. Videon then was called upon,
and made a talk supplementing the address of Judge Carl W. Fulghum,
and laid a part of the blame at least for delay in settling of estates to the
attorneys rather than to the statutes.
Before adjournment, it was decided that the association should
forthwith communicate with William E. Hutton, State Chairman of
the Legal Institutes Committee, and request that a Legal Institutes meeting be held at Glenwood Springs, Colorado, at the earliest convenience
of the Committee. A good attendance was assured.
-C.

H. DARROW, Correspondent.

The monthly meeting of the Boulder County Bar Association
was held in Longmont on December 18th. Prof. Laurence W. DeMuth of the University of Colorado was the speaker of the evening.
Following his talk a general discussion was had on various phases of
insurance law.
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PUEBLO BAR HOLDS ANNUAL MEETING
THE ANNUAL MEETING of the Pueblo County Bar Association
was held on December 16th, 1939, in the District Court Room of the
Pueblo County Court House. There were in attendance at such meeting forty-eight practicing attorneys, District Judges Harry Leddy and
French L. Taylor, and County Judge Hubert Glover.
The meeting was called to order by the President, Lawrence E.
Langdon, and the reports from the various standing committees were
had. Following the reports of the various committees a memorial was
presented by Harry P. Vories on the death of Judge John Murphy, who
died during the past year. Following the reading of the memorial and
the resolution by the Bar Association on the same, the District Court
for the Tenth Judicial District, sitting en banc, ordered that the
memorial be spread upon the records of the District Court. Judge
Hubert Glover, County Judge, then ordered that the same be spread
upon the records of the County Court of Pueblo County.
Benjamin F. Koperlik, a member of the Board of Governors of
the Colorado Bar Association, submitted his report on the last meeting of the Board of Governors. This report was approved by the
Association.
The following new members were submitted for membership:
John Fericy, Vincent Cristiano, J. Gregory Donahue, and their application for membership was unanimously accepted by the Bar Association.
A resolution was introduced and passed by the Association provided for a dinner meeting of the Association to be held every three
months.
Election of officers was held, and the following officers were elected
for the ensuing year:
Ralph L. Neary, President.
Harry P. Vories, Vice-President.
0. G. Pope, Secretary and Treasurer.
Following the election, President Neary gave a short talk and
announced that the various committees for the year 1940 would be
appointed within the next few weeks, following which the meeting
was adjourned.
-- CHARLES J. RIBAR, Correspondent.
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KELLY SPEAKS AT UTAH BAR MEETING
AT THE UTAH STATE BAR annual meeting December 8 and 9,
1939, at Hotel Utah, Salt Lake City, three Colorado men were assigned principal parts. On the first morning, Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Orie L. Phillips was the principal speaker, following the address of President LeRoy B. Young of the Utah Bar. His address on
America's part and importance in keeping out of war and dangers of
consequent dictatorship was a high point.
On the second morning, Milton D. Green, formerly a practicing
lawyer of Denver, now law professor at Utah University, was main
speaker. His address on "Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative
Action" was so favorably received that it was ordered printed.
On the second afternoon session, William R. Kelly, president of
The Colorado Bar Association, spoke on "Post-admission Legal Education and the Significance of Growing Bar Association Membership".
Professor Fleming James, Jr., of the Yale University Law School was
the other guest speaker. His subject was "Contribution Between Joint
Tort Feasors."
The veteran United States Senator William H. King of Utah was
the honored speaker at the public meeting the evening of December 8.
David A. Simmons of Houston, Texas, of the Board of Governors of
the American Bar Association, was the sole speaker at the concluding
banquet on December 9.
The Utah State Bar was integrated in 1931 and is very active.

LEGAL INSTITUTE
On February 3, 1940, the first legal institute of the year will be
held at Greeley, Colorado, under the auspices of the Colorado Bar Association, working in conjunction with the Weld County Bar. Speakers
at the institute will be Albert J. Gould of Denver, who will talk on
"Recent Tax Developments," and Judge Lawrence Hinkley of Sterling,
who will speak on "Probate Procedure," according to announcement
made by William E. Hutton, chairman of the Legal Institutes Committee of the State Bar.
A meeting of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the courtroom has been called for Saturday, January 27, 1940, at
11 o'clock A. M., to take appropriate action in memory of the late
Mr. Justice Butler, according to an announcement received from Robert
H. Jackson, Solicitor General of the United States.

